International Review of Business and Economics
Volume 2

Issue 1

Article 7

3-1-2018

Corporate Governance and Accounting Information Disclosure in
the Nigerian Banking Sector
Igbekoyi Olusola Esther
Adekunle Ajasin University, estyshola@gmail.com

Agbaje Wale Henry
Adekunle Ajasin University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/irbe
Part of the Business Commons, and the Economics Commons

Recommended Citation
Esther, Igbekoyi Olusola and Henry, Agbaje Wale (2018) "Corporate Governance and Accounting
Information Disclosure in the Nigerian Banking Sector," International Review of Business and Economics:
Vol. 2: Iss. 1, Article 7.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/irbe/vol2/iss1/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for
inclusion in International Review of Business and Economics by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For
more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

International Review of Business and Economics (IRBE), Volume 2, Number 1, March 2018. ISSN 2474 -5146 (online) 2474-5138 ( Print)

27

4. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND
ACCOUNTING INFORMATION DISCLOSURE IN
THE NIGERIAN BANKING SECTOR
IGBEKOYI OLUSOLA ESTHER, Department of Accounting, Faculty
of Social and Management Sciences, Adekunle Ajasin University,
AkungbaAkoko, Ondo State, Nigeria. e.mail: estyshola@gmail.com
AGBAJE WALE HENRY, Department of Accounting, Faculty of Social and
Management Sciences, Adekunle Ajasin University, AkungbaAkoko, Ondo
State, Nigeria.
ABSTRACT
The study examine the effect of corporate governance on the quality of accounting information disclosed
in Nigerian banks. The study covers banks that are quoted in the Nigeria Stock Exchange. Data were
collected from secondary sources using the annual reports and factbook of selected banks during the
period of 2006-2015. Data collected were analyzed using statistical tools; unit root, co-integration and
error correction model. The corporate governance indices used in the study include; Audit committee
meeting (ACM), Audit committee qualification (ACQ), Board size (BS), Directors in audit committee (DAC),
Ownership structure (OS) and Corporate board members (CBM). The study revealed that ACM, ACQ,
BS, DAC and OS had a significant positive relationship with accounting information disclosure at 1% and
5% level of significance respectively, while it was discovered that CBM had a negative relationship but
was insignificant. It is concluded from the findings of the study that corporate governance contributes
to the quality of accounting information disclosed in the banking sector.

KEYWORDS: Corporate governance, Accounting Information Disclosure, Banking
Sector, Nigeria.
INTRODUCTION

T

he demand for information disclosure in the modern capital market is on the
rise and the reason stems from information asymmetry and agency conflicts
existing between the management and shareholders (Oyerogba, 2014). Although,
the extent and quality of disclosure within the annual reports vary from company to
another, it has been observed in previous studies that in the Nigerian context, corporate
reporting practices is weak (Ebiringa&Kunle, 2014; Ofoegbu& Okoye, 2006 and Wallace,
1998). Sanusi (2010) stated that since consolidation, some banks were engaging in
unethical and potentially fraudulent business practices. It was further stated that these
malpractice within the consolidated banks has become a way of life in large part of
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the sector; thereby enriching a few at the expense of many depositors and investors.
Sanusi further opined that corporate governance in many banks failed because boards
ignored corporate governance practices by participating in obtaining unsecured loans at
the expense of depositors and not having directors with qualification to enforce good
corporate governance on bank management. In addition, the audit processes broke
down and as the size of the banks grew the complexities continued within them. In a
situation where committee were even in place, for example audit committee among
others, they were mostly ineffective or dormant.
Accounting information contains the necessary information that stakeholders
need in decreasing uncertainty and assisting them in making appropriate financial
and economic decisions, making it much valued by the stakeholders (Ala’ Hussein &
Mohammad, 2015). Further, Nandi and Ghosh (2012) stated that companies’ annual
financial reports contain diverse information and thus, they are deemed as one of the
most essential sources of information. According to Edogiawerie and Oziegbe,(2016),
a good financial report must not only be capable of providing users with mandatory
information disclosures but as well go extra mile in providing voluntary information so as
to meet the need of the various categories of users. Provision of information upon which
sound investment decision can be made is the goal of all disclosure requirements so as
to reduce uncertainties and understand as much as possible the values of the company
as inferred from its reports (Glassman, 2003).
The significance of corporate governance to the survival of the banking sector
cannot be over-emphasized. Jafaru and Iyoha (2012) stated that a healthy corporate
governance culture is imperative in the banking sector where the retention of public
confidence remains of utmost importance. They further stated that poor corporate
governance has been identified as one of the major factors in virtually all known instances
of distress in banks. Public confidence here depends largely on the accounting information
obtained by the public from the respective company; and this is the major tool that
is used for decision-making. The introduction of the code of corporate governance is
to produce a bench work that will influence business practices in organizations most
especially the banking sector. This is because of the increased rate of distress in the
sector and the effect of the performance of the banks will have significant effect on
the Nigerian capital market and by implication, the economy at large.Jouini (2013)
stated that corporate governance help company to reduce mismanagement, to remedy
deficiencies in governance mechanism and to prevent abuse of power and management
of risks. The compliance of companies into these recommendations is essential and it
forms the basis for evaluating the quality of the governance system and thereby leads
to protection of the reputation of the company. The focus of this study is not limited on
the accounting information disclosed by the banks according to the code of corporate
governance information index but to examine the quality of the information disclosed by
these banks in a given financial year.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
Conceptual Clarifications
Corporate Governance
Norlia, Zam and Ibrahim (2011) describe corporate governance as the structures
and processes for the direction and control of companies. Corporate governance concerns
the relationships among the management, Board of Directors, controlling shareholders,
minority shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate governance structure specifies
the distribution of rights and responsibilities among the different participants in the
organization. According to Rogers (2008), corporate governance is about building
credibility, ensuring transparency and accountability as well as maintaining an effective
channel of information disclosure that would foster good corporate performance. It
was further opined that, corporate governance is about how to build trust and sustain
confidence among the various groups that make up an organization. Alexandra, Reed,
and Lajoux(2005) defines corporate governance as the system by which companies are
directed and controlled. The nature of corporate governance, therefore, going by this
definition consists of two dimensions: direction and control. The direction dimension of
corporate governance emphasizes the responsibility of the board to attend to strategic
positioning and planning in order to enhance the performance and sustainability of the
company; while on the other hand, emphasizes the responsibility of the board to oversee
the executive management of the company in the execution of the plans and strategies.
The aim of corporate governance is to ensure that corporations are managed in
the best interests of their owners and shareholders (Ahmed, Alam, Jafar& Zaman 2008).
This applies specifically to listed companies where the majority of the shareholders are
not in participatory everyday management positions; although, it can also apply to other
forms of corporations such as companies with few principal owners and a large group of
smaller shareholders, public corporations (where all citizens are stakeholders) partnerowned companies and privately owned companies where the ownership has been
divided through inheritance in one or several generations (Ahmed, Alam, Jafar& Zaman
2008). It is therefore concluded that corporate governance assures transparency, investor
protection, full disclosure of executive actions and corporate activities to stakeholders,
environmental impact assessment of corporate activities, assurance of performance
related to executive compensation and full disclosure of executive compensation ( Osaze,
2007).
NATURE AND SCOPE OF ACCOUNTING INFORMATION DISCLOSURE
Accounting information contains the necessary information that
stakeholders need in order to decrease uncertainty and assist them in making appropriate
financial and economic decisions (Ala’ Hussein & Mohamad, 2015). One of the major
responsibilities of the board of directors is to ensure that stakeholders are provided
with high-quality disclosures on the financial and operating results of the entity that the
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have been entrusted with governing (Adeshina, Ikhu&Olaleye 2015). Almost all corporate
governance codes around the world, including the OECD specifically require the board
of directors to provide stakeholders with information on the financial and operating
results of a company to enable them to properly understand the nature of its business,
its current state of affairs and how it is being developed for the future.(OECD2010) The
quality of financial disclosure depends significantly on the robustness of the financial
reporting standards on the basis of which the financial information is prepared and
reported. In most circumstances, the financial reporting standards required for corporate
reporting are contained in the generally accepted accounting principles recognized in the
country where the entity is domiciled. There are different channels that companies use
to disclose information, such as annual reports, conference calls, analyst presentations,
investor relations, interim reports, prospectuses, press releases, and websites, among
others; the corporate annual report is considered a very important official disclosure
channel (Hope, 2003).
Corporate disclosure can be divided into two broad categories, mandatory
disclosure and voluntary disclosure. Mandatory disclosure is information revealed in
the fulfilment of disclosure requirements of statute in the form of laws, professional
regulations, standards and the listing rules of stock exchanges while voluntary disclosure
is any information revealed in excess of mandatory disclosure. Voluntary disclosure aims
at introducing and explaining companies’ potentials to investors, driving the fluidity of
capital market, guaranteeing more effective allocation of capitals, and decreasing capital
costs. According to relevant laws and regulations, compulsory disclosure and voluntary
disclosure can be transformed mutually. In different economic, political, legal, and social
environments, countries face different conditions concerning voluntary disclosure due to
the differences in relevant laws. On the other hand, compulsory disclosure can depress or
affect voluntary disclosure. Ronen and Yaari (2002) point out that compulsory disclosure
cannot stop the disclosure of false information but restrain voluntary disclosure.
Therefore, some companies may choose to adopt a partial disclosure strategy by which
they merely disclose positive news or negative news.The importance of corporate
disclosure is that it is a means of communication between management, outside
investors and market participants in general.Demand for corporate disclosure arises
from the information asymmetry problem and agency conflicts between management
and outside investors (Healy & Palepu, 2001). Enhanced corporate disclosure is believed
to mitigate these problems as opined by Healy and Palepu, (2001); Graham, Harvey and
Rajgopal (2005).
The supply of corporate disclosure or the way in which information disclosure
is managed is referred to as disclosure position Gibbins, Richardson and Waterhouse
(1990). The study identified Ritualism and opportunism as the two disclosure position.
The ideaof the dimension is whether management plays an active or passive role in
managing disclosure. Ritualism refers to uncritical adherence to predefined disclosure
norms that arises from internal behavioural patterns, motivation perhaps by an
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effective system of corporate governance, and not from external disclosure regulations.
Opportunism is the propensity to seek firm specific advantages in the disclosure of
financial information (Graham, Harvey &Rajgopals, 2005). Companies may benefit from
providing more information to the public through a reduction in their cost of capital or an
increase in the pure cash flows accruing to their shareholders, consequently increasing
their values. However, providing information to the public is not a costless task. Among
the costs of disclosure are the costs of information production and dissemination;
cost of competitors accessing vital information about a company (Wagenhofer, 1990).
Furthermore, lawsuit costs may be incurred when a company is sued regarding its
disclosure if the information subsequently turns out to be erroneous (Skinner, 1994).
Thus, a decision to provide more information to the public should, in theory, be based
on a cost-benefit analysis although detailed estimation of all costs and benefits is difficult
(Botosan, 2000).
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTING INFORMATION DISCLOSURE
Klai and Omri (2011) strongly debated that there is a relationship between corporate
governance and the financial information reported by firms. Financial reporting is a
crucial element necessary for the corporate governance system to function effectively.
Section 3.16 of the CBN Codes (2006), state that transparency and adequate disclosure
of information is the key attribute of corporate governance. In relation to this, Rogers
(2008) suggest the disclosure of more information pertaining to the capital structure
and control of the company is one of the ways to win public confidence. Despite this
assertion, Karim, Islam and Chowdhury (1998) however discovered in a study conducted
on financial reporting using 146 firms in Bangladesh firms as focus, that firms only
disclose 26 percent of the voluntary disclosure on the average. Morwan, Mohammad
and Chek (2011) however submitted in a study conducted on Malaysian firms that,
failure of corporate governance leads to failure in financial reporting in Malaysia. The
corporate governance indices that relates to board, ownership and audit committee
are the area of focus of this study. The findings of studies conducted on the effect of
corporate governance on accounting information disclosure are inconclusive.
Previous studies conducted affirm the significance of the corporate governance
indices adopted in the study to accounting information disclosure. Bhagat and Jefferis
(2002) stated that audit is important in implementing corporate governance principles
and improving the value of a firm. The audit is important because in the event of financial
manipulations, the auditors are held accountable for their actions as the availability of
transparent financial information reduces the information asymmetry and improves
the value of a firm. Hanrahan, Ramsay and Stapledon (2001) stated also that the board
of directors play significant role in improving corporate governance because if they
perform their fiduciary duties effectively, the performance of the firm will be elevated.
The size of the board is also significant because the larger the board, the larger the range
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of expertise to make better decision (Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Karamanou and Vafeas
(2005) also demonstrated that corporations with more efficient boards and stronger
audit committees led to the issuance of more forecasts by management that were also
more accurate.
In a study conducted by Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) on the association between
corporate boards, audit committees, and management earnings forecasts; submitted
that corporations with more efficient boards and stronger audit committee led to the
issuance of more forecasts by management that were also more accurate. Contrary to
this results, research conducted by Koehn and Ueng (2005) on evaluating the evaluators
as to whether investors should trust corporate governance metrics rating, stated that
firms with poor governance practices provided financial information that was at least
as good as firms with strong corporate governance. In addition, Farber (2005) found
that firms previously cited for fraud had difficulty overcoming the stigma, even after
improving their corporate governance practices. It was stated specifically, that they still
faced issues with credibility as institutional holdings and the number of analyst following
the company did not increase subsequent to governance improvements.
Adebimpe and Peace (2011) tested the relationship between corporate governance,
company attributes and voluntary disclosures of quoted companies in Nigeria using
univariate, multivariate and cross section models. The evidence of the findings revealed
that only board size as a significant positive relationship with the extent of voluntary
disclosures in selected firms. Allegrini and Greco (2011) also stated that there is a positive
linkage between board size and diligence, and corporate voluntary disclosure; Gao and
Kling (2012) also found that board size positively affect firm’s compliance to the disclosure
requirements; and Al-Janadi, Abdul Raham and Omar (2013) submitted that board size
appears to substantially contribute to quality voluntary disclosure establishment; while
Xiang, Li and Li (2014) Further state that board size has also been found to have an
unusual positive impact on quality of information disclosure (Xiang et al.,2014). Some
studies have however stated that board size and accounting information disclosure have
no linkage and the result from a study conducted by Yermack (1996) show a negative
association between board size and firm valuation. It was stated further that the board
should be of a sufficient size relative to the scale and complexity of the company’s
operations and be composed in such a way as to ensure diversity of experience without
compromising independence, compatibility, integrity and availability of members to
attend meetings. The justification for this submission a larger board size may bring a
greater number of directors with experience that may represent multitude of values
on the board (Halme&Huse, 1997). A contrary view opined that a reduced number of
directors imply a high degree of coordination and communication between them and
managers.
Kosnik (1990) argues that board performance is associated with the composition
of directors. Outside directors are arguably more effective than inside directors in
maximising shareholders’ wealth. In contrast, Klein (2002) suggests that inside directors
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can contribute more to a firm than outside directors due to their firm-specific knowledge
and expertise. Ho and Wong (2001) do not find an association between the number of
outside non-executive directors and the extent of voluntary disclosure. Goodstein, Guatam
and Boeker (1994) highlight the importance of outside board members in carrying out
the board’s decision control function. Pearce and Zahra (1992) report that more outside
directors on a board increase a firm’s environmental uncertainty.
EMPIRICAL REVIEW
Jafaru and Iyoha (2012) conducted a study on directors and corporate governance
in the banking sectors: evidence from Nigeria. The study seek to identify the challenges
of corporate governance faced by directors in the Nigeria banking sector. The study used
ex-post factor research design and centeredon the views of executive and non-executive
directors of banks in Nigeria. Data collected were analysed using simple percentages,
averages, andrank order statistical tools. The study revealed that the major challenge of
corporate governance is the effectiveness of the audit committee and lack of shareholder
activism.
In a similar study conducted by Adeoye (2015) on corporate governance in the
Nigeria banking sector: issues and challenges. The aim of the paper was to examine the
issues and challenges around corporate governance in the Nigerian banking industry. The
study collected data from primary sources using questionnaire. The study found lack of
presentation of information common in banks in pre-consolidation and post consolidation
era. Frauds, override of internal control and non-adherence to limit authority in a bid
to meet set targets and recapitalization of bank plays vital role in promoting effective
corporate governance. In addition, lack of effective corporate governance results in the
failure of banks in Nigeria.
Ejeagbasi, Nweze, Ezeh and Nze studied corporate governance and audit quality in
Nigeria; evidence from the banking industry. The study examined the relationship between
corporate governance and the quality of auditors report with evidence from the Nigerian
banking industry. The study adopted the ex-post facto research design and related on
historic data of eleven (11) deposit banks in Nigeria. The study used correlation analysis
and it was found that board composition has a negative and insignificant relationship
with audit quality while separation of roles of the CEO from that of the board, board size
and composition of audit committee has positive but insignificant relationship with audit
quality.
Jouini (2013) studied corporate governance system and quality of financial
information. The study determine the relationship between system of governance and the
quality of financial information for a sample of French companies listed in the SBF 250 for
a period of 2004-2008. The quality of financial information was measured by discretionary
accruals while corporate governance was measured by the global index with 64 items
and the sub-indices relating to the characteristics of the board, ownership structure and
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quality of the central system. The study found that quality of financial information is
positively related to the quality of the board and the quality of the ownership structure.
The use of the overall governance index gives more significant results for the three
models and affirms the positive relationship between the quality of governance system
and the quality of financial reporting.
Fares, Haitham, Haitham and Mohammed (2013) conducted a study on corporate
governance and its impact on the quality of accounting information in the industrial
community shareholding companies listed in Ammanfinancial market-Jordan. The
study was aimed at examining the impact of governance on the quality of accounting
information, a field study on industrial firms listed in Amman financial market. Data were
obtained from both primary and secondary sources of data which were obtained through
administration of questionnaire to 50 industrial companies. Statistical package for the
social sciences (SPSS) was used to analyse the data obtained and test the formulated
hypothesis. The findings of the study revealed that there is effective implementation of
the principles of corporate governance affect the quality of financial reporting, makes
it more accurate and quality in a community study. Furthermore, it found that they
should be fully aware of the designers and users of financial statements of the concept
of corporate governance and the foundations of their application industrial companies
listed on valuable Amman financial market.
Nesrine and Abdulwahed (2011) conducted a study on corporate governance and
financial reporting quality: The case of Tunisian firms. The study examine the effect of
the governance mechanisms on the financial reporting quality for a sample of Tunisian
firms listed on Tunis Stock Exchange during the period of 1997-2007. The study utilised
a sample of 22 non-financial firms listed in the Tunis stock exchange during the period
covered in this study. The findings of the study revealed that the governance mechanisms
affect the financial information quality of the Tunisian companies. Particularly, the power
of the foreigners, the families and the block holders reduces the reporting quality, while
the control by the state and the financial institutions is associated with a good quality of
financial disclosure.
Ibadin and Dabor (2015) conducted a study on corporate governance and accounting
quality: empirical investigations from Nigeria. The study was aimed at examining corporate
governance and quality of financial reporting of companies in Nigeria. Secondary source
of data from 150 companies in Nigeria from 2006-2009 was used to gather data. The data
were analysed using ordinary least square (OLS) of multiple regression along with the
descriptive statistics to obtain the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum
values. The findings of this study from 2006 through to 2009 showed a mixed result.
Myring and Shortridge (2010) conducted a study on corporate governance and the
quality of financial disclosures. The study aimed at utilizing analyst’s earnings forecasts
to provide an alternate framework for examining the impact of corporate governance
procedures on the quality of accounting information in the financial market. The study
utilized sample and descriptive statistics to analyse the data gathered in this study. The
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utilized sample and descriptive statistics to analyse the data gathered in this study. The
findings of this study provide mixed evidence to support the notion that the strength of
corporate governance impacts the quality of financial statement information.
Joseph and Ahmed (2017) conducted a study on corporate governance and financial
reporting quality in Nigeria. The study was aimed to investigate corporate governance
and financial reporting quality of companies listed on the Nigeria stock exchange from
2006 to 2015. Data were obtained from annual reports of 40 quoted companies on NSE
from 2006-2015. Multiple regression analysis was used to test the research question
formulated in the study. The finding of the study revealed that corporate governance
improves the financial reporting quality in Nigeria.
Zahid (2016) conducted a study on corporate governance and value relevance of
accounting information: evidence from Pakistan. The study aims to investigate the impact
of corporate governance on value relevance of accounting information of KSE index nonfinancial companies for the time period of 11 years from 2005-2014. The study has used
the data of 90 companies in Pakistan. The study use panel data estimation technique and
used fixed effect model. The findings of the study revealed that corporate governance
have significant effect on value relevance of accounting information, that is, board
independence and board size have positive and significant impact on earnings per share.
Audit quality have insignificant impact on earnings per share while board independence,
board size and audit quality have insignificant effect on book value per share.
Gois conducted a study on financial reporting quality and corporate governance:
the Portuguese companies’ evidence. The main objective of the paper is to analyse the
relationship between the composition and characteristics of corporate governance on
the financial reporting quality of Portuguese companies. Data were obtained from annual
reports, paper, the necessary elements were collected by hand because there was no
registration information for the required period. Thus, the sample of the study comprises
of 234 firm observation per year, obtained by way evidence relating to 39 firms for 6
years. Multivariate analysis was used to analyse the formulated hypothesis. The findings
of the study reveals that board composition changes and its degree of independence do
not produce any influence on the quality of the accounting information.
Adeyemi and Asaolu (2013) conducted a study on empirical investigation of the
financial reporting practices and banks’ stability in Nigeria. The study was aimed at
examining financial reporting practices among post consolidation banks in Nigeria and the
subsequent stability of the banks. The study relied on secondary data collected through
in-depth content analysis of published annual reports and accounts between 2005 and
2009. The finding of the study indicated a high level of compliance withthe mandatory
disclosure requirement for banks by scoring on the CDI (mean in excess of 90%). The
regression analysis results showed that disclosure has a positive and significant influence
on banks stability (as defined by ROA and liquidity)
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Nigeria. The study uses historical data. Research data are drawn from financial statements
and notes of firms listed in NSE. The results indicate that there were variations in the
perceptions of information by users of the importance of disclosure requirements.
Statistical tests indicate that the level of disclosure by companies seems to cause
differences in the perceived importance of items in the income statement and statement
of financial position sections. A high degree of importance was attached to disclosure
items such as earnings per share, investments opportunities, and performance than
corporate governance information disclosed. Despite of financial reports quality, it can
be drawn from this study that all information users do find corporate governance items
disclosed in financial reports as useful for their investment decision-making process.
Sheila,Ridzwana and Syed (2013) examined the impact of corporate governance
on disclosure quality: empirical evidence from listed banks in Malaysia. Corporate
governance variables tested in this study are the board leadership structure, board
composition, board size, director ownership, institutional ownership and block
ownership. The results reveal that better disclosure quality of the annual reports in
banking sector can be achieved by having separate board leadership structure, higher
proportion of independent non-executive directors, higher board size, lower ownership
by the directors, institutional and block shareholders.
Carlos,Sabri and Amal (2013) examined corporate governance and voluntary
disclosure in France ,using a panel of 206 non-financial French listed firms during the
period 2006–2009, it find evidence that voluntary disclosure in annual reports increases
with managerial ownership, board and audit committee independence, board meeting
frequency, and external audit quality. The study also finds that frequency of audit
committee meetings and diligence of board and auditing are associated with decreased
disclosure. Additional findings show that larger, more profitable, and less indebted firms
have greater voluntary disclosure.
Wendy,Philip,Wenwen andQiyu (2016) examined the link between corporate
governance, companies’ disclosure practices and their equity market transparency in a
study of more than 5,000 listed in 23 countries covering 2003-2008.The findings of the
study confirm the belief that better- governed firms make more frequent disclosures
to the market. The study also found greater disclosure in common law relative to code
law countries; also firm with better governance in both code and common laws make
more frequent disclosures. More detailed analysis reveals only certain components of
corporate governance are associated with disclosures and overall transparency. Taken
as a whole, our results confirm corporate governance can play a significant role in
determining the efficiency of a country’s equity market.
Mark and Rebecca, (2010) examined the relationship between corporate
governance and the quality of financial disclosure. Using data from The Corporate Library,
an investment research firm that grades the corporate governance structures of U.S.
companies, the study examined the impact of strong corporate governance on financial
reporting by assessing the analysts information environment. The results provide
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mixed evidence on the relationship between corporate governance and the quality of
financial disclosures. Specifically, governance scores from The Corporate Library tend
not to be related to analysts’ consensus or the accuracy of individual forecasts. The only
governance attribute that appears to impact uncertainty is the number of best practices
followed by our sample companies
Shamimul, Syed and Robert (2013) examined corporate governance and financial
disclosures: Bangladesh perspective .The study analysis overall disclosure index of twenty
non-financial companies listed in DSE. The results show that corporate governance
is significantly associated with the extent of financial reporting disclosures. External
auditor, multi-listing and profitability are significantly associated with overall financial
reporting disclosures index. It was discovered in the study that external auditor, a
corporate governance variable, can significantly influence the level of corporate financial
disclosures. Other variables, such as, board independence, board-size, dominant
personality, institutional ownership and general public are not meaningfully associated
with the level of financial disclosures. As such, the corporate governance structure in
Bangladesh is not at the acceptable level.
METHODOLOGY
The study was conducted using data from secondary sources to determine the
effect of corporate governance on accounting information disclosure in Nigerian banks.
The analysis was done using analytical tools; unit root test, co-integration test and
vector correction test; inorder to determine the short run and long run effect of the
variables. The data used was obtained from the annual reports of selected banks and
factbook for period of 2006-2015. Data on board size, composition of board members,
directors in audit committee, audit committee meeting, audit committee qualification
and ownership structure were obtained from annual reports and factbook, while data
on accounting information disclosure was derived using information from the disclosure
index; which was scored using the unweighted method (Cooke, 1991) as adopted by
Adelopo (2011). The unweighted index is computed as; the number of items disclosed
by a company in a given year divided by number of item it could disclose.
Model Specification
To establish the effect between these variable, the general model specification is
represented as;
Y = β0 + β1BS + β2CBM + β3DAC + β4OS+β5ACQ +β6ACM +μ1.............................
..eqn (1)
The general specific for this study is as follows;
Where;Y
= Accounting information disclosure 		
BS
= Board size
CBM = Composition of Board Members
DAC = Director in Audit Committee
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ACM = Audit Committee Meeting 		
ACQ = Audit Committee Qualification
OS
= Ownership Structure 			
μ
= Error term
β0
= Parameter to be estimated ( is the average amount the dependent variable
increase when the independent variable increase by one unit, other independent held
constant)
β1- β3= Partial derivatives or the gradient of the independent.
Data Analysis Technique
Unit Root Test
The unit root test was conducted using the Augmented Dickey Fuller Test (ADF)
and DF- GLS. The test is carried out to ascertain the stationarity properties of the time
series in order to avoid spurious regression in the regression estimates and ensure
reliability of estimates and therefore the application of appropriate test statistic for long
run relationship/effect. The ADF formula is thus specified

In an attempt to determine whether a short run dynamic relationship and long run relationship exist
between corporate governance and accounting information disclosure, equation 1 is however transformed to
its first difference to suit error correction model as below:

Where: Δ = First difference of each variable

o = Coefficient of the residual term

Co-integration Test
The primary aim of the study is to estimate the long run relationship between
Returns on Equity and capitalization, exchange rate, interest rate, market risk, and
credit risk. The correct specification of such a long-run relationship that will capture the
short-run deviations that might have occurred in estimating the long-run co-integrating
equation requires an error correction term (Onwioduokit&Adenuga, 2000; Osakwe,
1983). In this method, the number of co-integrating relations is tested on the basis of
trace statistics and maximum Eigen statistics. Once the presence of co-integration is
established, we estimate an error correction model (ECM) that includes both the long
run and short run dynamics. The Co-integration version of the above model is expressed as

39
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DATA PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSIONS OF FINDINGS
Unit Root Test
From the result obtained in table 1 using Engle Granger critical value at 10%, and
the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF). The unit root test according to the Augmented Dickey
Fuller (ADF) suggest that all the variables are stationary at first difference except board
size;but was found to be stationary at first difference when Dickey-Fuller generalized
least square was applied. Thus we apply the ECM and Johansen co-integration tests to
test long run relationship among the variables.
Variables
Y
BS
CBM
DAC
ACM
ACQ
OS
Variables

ADF
-1.436913
-1.410537
1.432470
0.160993
-0.837584
-0.905035
-1.771812
At Level
DF-GLS

BS

-1.651583

EG CV@10%

-3.04

At Level
Lag Length
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Lag Length

At First Difference
ADF
Lag Length
-6.030228**
1
-1.787981
1
-6.776514**
1
-2.936201*
1
-2.951447*
1
-3.013575*
1
-4.911207**
1
At First Difference
DF-GLS
Lag Length

1

-3.174280*

1

Decision
I(1)
N/S
I(1)
I(1)
I(1)
I(1)
I(1)
Decision

I(1)

NB: *, ** & *** represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively
Source: Author’s computation with E-view 9.0

Co-integration Test
The result of the co-integration test using the trace statistics and the Max-Eigen
statistics as shown in table 2, revealed that from the trace statistics, the null hypothesis
that there is no co-integration among the variables is rejected and the alternative
hypothesis is accepted that there is co-integration among the variables because the
probability of the hypothesis is less than 5% significance level, the result of the MaxEigen statistics suggests the same result.
The implication of this is that in the long run, all the variables moves together. We
therefore proceed to estimate the long run regression model and presented the result
in table 3.
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Table 2: Co-integration Test (Trace and Eigen value)
Sample (adjusted): 2007 2015
Included observations: 9 after adjustments
Trend assumption: linear deterministic trend
Series: Y ACM ACQ BS CBM DAC OS
Lag interval (in first difference) 1 to 1
Unrestricted Co-integration Rank test (Trace)
Hypothesized
No. of CE (s)
None*
At most 1*
At most 2*
At most 3
At most 4
At most 5
At most 6

Eigen Value
0.996470
0.843836
0.635047
0.478437
0.298946
0.259819
0.033363

Trace
Statistics
334.9699
142.9946
79.86175
45.59021
23.45874
11.38293
1.153690

Critical value (0.05)

125.6154
95.75366
69.81889
47.85613
29.79707
15.49471
3.841466

probability
0.0000
0.0000
0.0064
0.0804
0.2243
0.1890
0.2828

Trace Test indicates 3 co-integrating equations at 0.05 level
*Denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 0.05 level
*Mackinnon-Haug- Michelis (1999) p-values
Unrestricted Co-integration Rank Test (Eigen value)
Hypothesized
Eigen Value
Trace
No. of CE (s)
Statistics
None*
0.996470
191.9753
At most 1*
0.843836
63.13285
At most 2*
0.635047
34.27154
At most 3
0.478437
22.13147
At most 4
0.298946
12.07581
At most 5
0.259819
10.22924
At most 6
0.033363
1.153690

Critical value

probability

(0.05)

46.23142
40.07757
33.87687
27.58434
21.13162
14.26460
3.841466

0.0000
0.0000
0.0449
0.2137
0.5402
0.1973
0.2828

Trace Test indicates 3 co-integrating equations at 0.05 level
*Denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 0.05 level
*Mackinnon-Haug- Michelis (1999) p-values

Error Correction Model (ECM)

The error correction model result in table 3showR-squared statistics of 0.813814
which indicate that about 81.38 percent of the variation in accounting information
disclosure is explained by the combined effects of all the determinants (the independent
variables), the remaining 18.62 percent is attributed to the unexplained variations not
captured in this model.The F-statistic of 6.13 is significant at 5 percent level as indicated
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in the probability value estimate of 0.000237. The F-statistics shows that the explanatory
variables are jointly significant in explaining accounting information disclosure.The
result further show that the coefficients of the explanatory variables are statistically
significant to explaining accounting information disclosure as their probability values are
less than 5% except composition of board members which is negative and statistically
insignificant to explaining accounting information disclosure. The coefficient of the
error correction model further proves the validity of the long run relation among the
variables such that the coefficient of the error correction model is negative and it is
significant as the probability value is less than 5%, this result shows that the error
correction term actually corrects the disequilibrium of the system, and the speed at
which the disequilibrium is being corrected is 33.94% annually, in other word, the error
correction term shows that it is adjusting with the previous period disequilibrium at the
rate of 33.94%, we therefore conclude that there is a long-run tendency for an improved
accounting information disclosure relative to corporate governance. This implies that
accounting information disclosure can be treated as an endogenous factor, not a cause of
growth in corporate governance, hence corporate governance will influence accounting
information disclosure and not otherwise in the long run.
An individual examination of the coefficients and statistical significant of the
variables analysed show varying degree of relationships between the dependent
and explanatory variables. The outcome of the study reveal that Audit committee
meeting (DACM); Director in audit committee (DDAC); Ownership structure (DOS)
Audit committee qualification (DACQ) and Board size (DBS) with respective coefficients
of 0.108306; 0.146809; 0.0427594; 0.956038; and 0.811646 have significant positive
relationship with accounting information disclosure at 1% and 5% levels of significance
respectively. It was however discovered that Composition of board members (DCBM)
with coefficient (-0.726546) is negatively related to accounting information disclosure,
although the relationship is not significant.
The finding of this study further corroborate the findings of Adeshina, Ikhu
and Olaleye (2015) who found that corporate governance items disclosed in financial
reports are useful for investment decision making process. This was also supported
by Carlos, Sabri and Anal (2013) as found that voluntary disclosure in annual reports
increase with managerial ownership, board and audit committee independence, board
meeting frequency and external audit quality.Wendy, Philips, Wenwen and Qiyu (2016)
also found in a similar study conducted among Canadian listed companies revealed that
corporate governance plays a significant role in determining the efficiency of a country’s
equity market, the finding is relevant to this study because the performance of the
equity market is based upon the decision made by investors which is mostly informed by
the decisions made from accounting information disclosed in firms’ annual reports. The
findings of this study however negates the findings of Shaminul, Syed and Robert (2010)
in a similar study conducted in Bangladesh stating that board independence, board size,
director personality, institutional ownership and general public are not meaningfully
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associated with the level of financial disclosure. The findings of this study in Nigeria into
the period of this study however shows that board size and ownership structure are
significantly related to accounting information disclosure. The insignificant relationship
between composition of board members and accounting informationdisclosure
discovered in this study further uphold the findings of Ho and Wong (2001) who did
not find any association between the number of outside non-executive directors and
the extent of voluntary disclosure.
Table 3: Error Correction Model

Dependent variable: D(Y)
Method: Least square
Sample (adjusted): 2006 2015
Included observations: 10 after adjustments

Variable

Coefficient

Std Error

t- statistics

Prob.

C

13.46945

43.79410

0.307563

0.7608

D(ACM)

0.108306

0.066726

0.155967

0.0174*

D(ACQ)

0.956038

0.149658

-0.388171

0.0000*

D(BS)

0.811646

0.239731

-0.048579

0.0216**

D(CBM)

-0.726546

4.598519

-1.027841

0.3131

D(DAC)

0.146809

0.049288

0.029582

0.0081*

D(OS)

0.0427594

0.250377

0.001997

0.0038*

ECM(-1)

-0.339416

0.250377

-5.349604

0.0000*

R-Squared

0.813814

Mean Dependent var

5.914286

Adjusted R-squared

0.713691

S.D dependent var

29.96407

S.E of regression

20.89569

Akaike info criterion

9.114595

Sum squared resid

11789.01

Schwarz criterion

9.470103

Log likelihood

-151.5054

Hannan- Quinn criterion

9.237316

F- statistics

6.130637

Durbin- Watson statistics

2.329833

Prob. (F-statistics)

0.000237

Source: Author’s Computation using E-view 9.0
Note: * and ** indicates significant at 1% and 5% respectively

The finding of this study further upholds the justification for introduction of code
of corporate governance which is relevant especially in recent times when the rate of
misappropriation due to the manipulation of the financial statement have been on
the rise and the confidence of the investors have continued to decline. Although some
disclosure are regarded as voluntary, the rate at which the firm is willing to divulge
information will determine the confidence imposed on such firm.It was also discovered
that the corporate governance determinants that relates to audit quality significantly
relates to accounting information disclosure, this result is not far-fetched because it is
effective audit that proves the authenticity of annual report published. The findings of
this study have therefore supported the submission of theories and previous studies
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on the importance of audit maintenance of its independence. This is very important
especially in the banking sector that is vulnerable to misappropriation because of the
nature of its business.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Corporate governance is a regulatory tool used to ensure the effective protection
of the interest of stakeholders especially the public. The code of corporate governance
covers several aspects of business practices but this study focus on its effect on
accounting information disclosure. It is important to evaluate this area because, it is the
information disclosed by the companies that will ensure the kind of decision that will be
taken by the public and this will have a ripple effect on the industry of the stock market
and the economy as a whole. This study purposively select some corporate governance
determinants which includes; audit committee meeting, audit committee qualification,
board size, director in audit committee, ownership structure and composition of board
members. The empirical results of the co-integration analysis shows that there is a long
run equilibrium relationship among the variables; while the error correction model coefficient from the estimated short run dynamic model showed reasonable speed of
adjustment toward the long run equilibrium. Analysing the direction and magnitude of
the explanatory variables co-efficient, it was observed that audit committee meeting,
audit committee qualification, board size, directors in audit committee and ownership
structure positive significant relationship with accounting information disclosure during
the period 2006-2015, although they all have different magnitude of influence. It was
showed however that composition of board members have a negative relationship during
this period but it was not significant.
From the findings of this study, it is therefore recommended that strive to
increase the level of accounting information disclosureby making voluntary disclosure in
addition to complying fully with the corporate governance disclosure checklistin order to
continue to effectively gain the confidence of its accounting information users. Corporate
governance codes that relates to audit quality should be taken into considerations to
ensure that adequate measure are put in place to ensure quality of audit by focusing on
the frequency of audit committee meeting, qualification of audit committee members
and the members of directors that are audit committee members.
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